

IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, based on child and family advocacy groups active at the state level, I compare the strategic choices of 50 liberal and 29 conservative groups. Compared to conservative groups, liberal groups are less committed to outsider strategies, more likely to produce public policy reports, and somewhat more likely to join coalitions. Differences in the latter two strategic choices are attributable to the liberal groups' greater reliance on patrons (private foundations, government agencies) for funding. Evidence on news coverage suggests that the choice between insider and outsider strategies has important consequences.

INTRODUCTION

Despite impediments to group formation (Olson 1965), public interest groups abound. Indeed, they have proliferated since the 1960s (Walker 1983), and they seem to be thriving. Many of them possess highly skilled professional staffs, substantial budgets, or large memberships (Bosso 1997; Berry 1999; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004; Stone and Vaida 2004). Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the growth of these groups, including the strength of “purposive” incentives (Marwell and Ames 1979), the ingenuity of policy entrepreneurs (Salisbury 1969), and the importance of patrons and institutional sponsors (King and Walker 1991).

Both liberal and conservative public interest groups have had an impact on public policy. They have influenced Congress (Berry 1999), the federal bureaucracy (Yackee, forthcoming), and the federal courts (Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Kobylka 1991). They have influenced state legislatures (Ringquist 1993: 104-125; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996), state administrative agencies (Gormley 1983), judicial recall elections (Woliver 1993: 29-60), and initiative campaigns (Zwier 2003; Moen and Palmer 2003). In 2004, conservative groups won voter approval of constitutional amendments defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman in 11 of 11 states (Friel 2004).

In this paper, focusing on public interest groups active at the state level, I demonstrate notable differences in the strategic choices of liberal and conservative public interest groups. I characterize the paradigmatic liberal approach as more direct, more technocratic, and more collaborative. I characterize the paradigmatic conservative approach as more indirect, more rhetorical, and more independent. I also offer some evidence that helps to explain why public interest groups with different ideologies make such different strategic choices.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

Interest groups of all types draw upon the same basic repertoire of strategies and tactics (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). For example, face-to-face contacts (formal and informal) and testimony at public hearings are widely used techniques (Scholzman and Tierney 1986; Nownes and Freeman 1998). Talking with the press, organizing letter-writing campaigns, and mobilizing group members are also popular (Kollman 1998: 18).

Groups do differ, however, in the mix of strategies and tactics they employ. Public interest groups and labor unions often engage in protests or demonstrations and advertise policy positions, while trade associations, corporations, and professional associations do not (Kollman 1998: 18). Public interest groups rely more on outside lobbying than other interest groups (Scholzman and Tierney 1986: 431-432; Gais and Walker 1991: 117). Public interest groups are more likely to engage in grassroots appeals, more likely to talk with members of the press, and more likely to participate in protests or demonstrations (Nownes and Freeman 1998).

Although both liberal and conservative public interest groups have been studied (Bosso 1997; McFarland 1984; Green et al. 2003; Wilcox 1992), few direct comparisons have been made. A notable exception is a study of national public interest groups by Berry (1999), who found that conservative advocacy groups tended to pursue “outsider” strategies, while liberal advocacy groups tended to pursue a combination of “insider” and “outsider” strategies. These differences persisted through the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1994, even though Republicans enjoyed far greater access to congressional power centers after that time.

Berry focused exclusively on groups active at the national level and on one strategic choice (insider v. outsider strategies). Also, he lacked sufficient data to explain differences

between liberal and conservative public interest groups. As a result, many questions remain unanswered. Do state-level liberal and conservative public interest groups also differ in their strategic choices? Do they differ in their preference for insider strategies and in other respects as well? Do they differ in their coalition-building behavior? Do they differ in their willingness to engage in public policy research? And why do they differ? Is it because of differences in resources, funding sources, public support, or some other reason?

The literature is not altogether silent on these questions. In a study of national interest groups, Gais and Walker (1991) found that a group's staff size helps to predict the use of insider strategies, with bigger groups investing more heavily in insider strategies. They also found that funding sources matter. In particular, citizen groups were less likely to engage in outsider strategies when they relied more on patrons. To put it a bit differently, citizen groups were more likely to engage in outsider strategies when they relied more on membership contributions. Gais and Walker, however, did not distinguish between liberal and conservative citizen groups.

In another study of national interest groups, Hula (1999) found that liberal and conservative groups both regarded coalition-building as an effective strategy. Liberal groups registered greater enthusiasm for coalition-building, but conservative groups found it easier to form long-term coalitions. Hula, however, did not focus on public interest groups in particular. For example, his conservative groups included firms, trade associations, and professional associations.

Building on this literature, I would like to suggest the following hypotheses:

- 1. Conservative public interest groups are more likely than liberal public interest groups to devote time to outsider strategies.*

Liberal groups have more resources, and insider strategies require resources. You need to hire full-time lobbyists, and you need to pay them well if you are to impress busy public officials. Conservative groups have fewer resources, but they have a better chance of enlisting public support. According to recent public opinion polls, conservatives outnumber liberals by approximately 2 to 1 (Saad 2004). This does not mean that the public supports conservative advocacy groups on particular issues. On the Terry Schiavo case, for example, public opinion deviated sharply from the expressed views of prominent conservative groups. Nevertheless, the public's self-professed conservative orientation is an important asset for conservative groups. Until this changes, a good strategy for conservative groups is to appeal to public opinion.

2. Liberal public interest groups are more likely than conservative public interest groups to invest in public policy research.

Liberal groups rely more for their funding on patrons, while conservative groups rely more on members. This tugs them in different directions. Patrons, such as government agencies and private foundations, are more devoted to empirical research, while mass memberships are more devoted to rhetorical arguments. To some degree, the presence or absence of public policy research may also be a function of the kinds of issues the two groups address. As Rich (2004: 40) puts it: "Abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia are examples of issues that produce far more moral than technical quandaries for policy makers." To the extent that conservative groups focus more on moral issues, this should make them less interested in empirical research.

3. Liberal public interest groups are more likely than conservative public interest groups to engage in coalition-building.

To some degree, a broad-based coalition may be viewed as an alternative to broad public support. With substantial mass memberships, conservative groups may not need coalition partners as much as liberal groups. Facing a less supportive public, liberal public interest groups may seek support from other organizations. Many of these other organizations – especially business groups and church groups -- might be viewed as natural allies for conservative groups. Precisely for this reason, such organizations are attractive as coalition partners for liberal public interest groups. On the other hand, interest groups with larger budgets prefer to work alone (Heaney 2004), and liberal groups have larger budgets. This may weaken any connection between liberalism and coalition-building.

METHODOLOGY

I focused on state-level advocacy groups because the states' diverse political environments facilitate quantitative empirical research. In addition, the states are increasingly important in social policy and morality policy because of devolution at the federal level.

To obtain data on the strategic choices of liberal and conservative advocacy groups active at the state level, I focused on two types of interest groups: child advocacy groups (predominantly liberal) and family advocacy groups (predominantly conservative).¹ I identified a universe of liberal child advocacy groups through VOICES for America's Children, which has 59 state affiliates. I identified a universe of conservative family advocacy groups through the Heritage Foundation and, to a lesser extent, the Eagle Forum. The Heritage Foundation groups (N=37) were those state affiliates with a clear emphasis on family values, as indicated on a website sponsored by the Heritage Foundation.² The Eagle Forum groups (N=5) were those with a

web-site and a clearly identifiable contact person.

After identifying the groups, I contacted the executive director of each group and attempted to arrange an interview. Ultimately, 50 of the 59 liberal groups and 29 of the 42 conservative advocacy groups agreed to be interviewed. Most of the interviews took place during the summer of 2003, though some were conducted during the summer of 2004. Regardless of when the interview took place, executive directors were asked to focus on strategic choices during 2003.

In each interview, I asked respondents to identify the top three issues for 2003. For each issue, I asked about policy arguments, strategies to influence public officials, strategies to influence citizens or voters, and coalition building. In addition, I asked about frequent coalition partners, frequent political opponents, mass mobilization, public policy research, and organizational resources.

To get more specific information on strategic choices for the full calendar year, I contacted each group in 2004 and asked the executive director to complete a brief questionnaire survey. The survey focused on the allocation of time and effort between “insider” and “outsider” strategies, the frequency of use of particular strategies, coalition activity, mass media coverage, public policy research, and funding sources, for 2003. The surveys were administered between January and July 2004. All 50 of the child advocacy groups interviewed in the summer participated in the survey, as did 25 of the 29 family advocacy groups.

To compare strategic choices, I report descriptive statistics for liberal and conservative groups, respectively. A difference of means tests reveals whether differences are statistically significant.

To explain strategic choices, I utilize OLS regression analysis (if the dependent variable

is interval-level) or ordered logit analysis (if the dependent variable is ordinal-level). If group type (liberal, conservative) is a statistically significant predictor of a strategic choice (Y) in an equation with variable X excluded but not in an equation with variable X included, then variable X can be said to explain the positive correlation between group type and Y.

VARIABLES

Key strategic choices (or dependent variables) include the following: insider v. outsider strategies; public policy research; and coalition-building.

Insider v. Outsider Strategies -- In the survey, respondents were asked to estimate how much time and effort they devoted to insider strategies, outsider strategies, and other strategies in 2003. Insider strategies were defined as including legislative lobbying, legislative committee testimony, direct contacts with agency officials, and direct contacts with gubernatorial aides. Outsider strategies were defined as including press releases, mass mailings, interviews with reporters, press conferences, op-ed pieces, rallies and demonstrations, and public education. The “other” category included service delivery, fund-raising, and organizational management. All responses were expressed as a percent of total time and effort, so that the three responses (insider, outsider, other) added up to 100 percent.

Public Policy Research -- In the initial interview, respondents were asked to characterize their approach to public policy research. From these comments, I constructed a four-point ordinal scale that captured each organization’s professed commitment to producing public policy research in-house (two points) and to using public policy research produced elsewhere (two points). In the subsequent survey, respondents were also asked how many public policy research reports they produced in 2003.

Coalition-Building -- For each of the organization's top three issue priorities, respondents were asked (in the interview) to name as many as four coalition partners. For each organization, the minimum score was 0, and the maximum score was 12.³ Respondents were also asked (in the survey) whether they participated in a coalition with any of the following groups in 2003: a religious organization; a business organization, or a non-religious, nonprofit organization. For each organization, the minimum score was 0, and the maximum score was 3.

Possible explanatory factors include the following:

Group Type – liberal v. conservative, with 1 signifying a liberal group (or child advocacy group), 0 signifying a conservative group (or family advocacy group).

Staff Size -- Each organization was asked to specify the total number of persons who worked for the organization in 2003.

Funding Sources -- Respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of organization funding that came from each of the following four sources in 2003: membership dues; government grants or contracts; private foundation grants or contracts; and individual gifts. Responses to this question were combined to create two new variables: Grassroots Funding (the percentage of funds from membership dues and individual gifts); and Patron Funding (the percentage of funds from government agencies and private foundations).⁴ In the analyses below, the patron funding variable was used.

Opposition -- Respondents were asked to name as many as three groups “that have sometimes opposed you in the past.” An opponent could be another interest group, a particular political party, or a loose cluster of individuals. The minimum score was 0; the maximum score was 3.

Republican House -- The percentage of state House seats controlled by the Republican

Party in 2003 was calculated for each state and then assigned to each group. The minimum was 14.7% and the maximum was 76.7%.

Republican Governor -- Each state was assigned a dummy variable to indicate whether the governor in 2003 was Republican. A state with a Republican governor received a 1; a state with a Democratic governor received a 0.

Legislative Session Length – a measure of how long each state legislature remained in session in 2003 (the number of months).

Interest Group Density – the ratio of the state’s gross state product to the number of organizations registered to lobby before the state legislature, 1990 (Gray and Lowery 1996).⁵

South – whether a state is in the South, defined as states of the Old Confederacy.

Citizen Ideology – a measure of each state’s citizens’ ideology, 1976-88, as indicated by the percentage of self-identified conservatives (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993: 16).

Ideally, it would also be possible to control for issue priorities or agendas. But differences in the agendas of liberal and conservative public interest groups are so stark that there is virtually no overlap in their agendas. For example, of 50 liberal public interest groups, none identified gay marriage or gay rights as a top issue (14 of 29 conservative groups did). Of 29 conservative public interest groups, none identified child health as a top issue (27 of 50 liberal groups did). In short, the correlation between group type and agenda is too high to include both variables in the same statistical model. It would appear that ideological differences are as much about agendas as they are about policy choices.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

As Table 1 indicates, liberal and conservative groups differ in their relative emphasis on

“insider” and “outsider” strategies. Insider strategies account for 29.1 percent of the liberal groups’ time, and 15.8 percent of the conservative groups’ time. In contrast, outsider strategies account for 25.8 percent of the liberal groups’ time, 39.8 percent of the conservative groups’ time.

Liberal and conservative groups also differ in their orientation towards public policy research. Although there is no discernible difference in the groups’ professed commitment to public policy research, the raw numbers of public policy reports generated suggest a profound difference between the two groups. Whereas liberal groups, on average, produce 5.8 public policy reports per year, conservative groups, on average, produce only 0.7 public policy reports per year. Whatever their attitudes towards public policy research in general, the liberal groups engage in public policy research much more than the conservative groups.

Liberal and conservative groups also differ in their coalition-building behavior, though the differences are more subtle. Conservative groups are just as likely as liberal groups to mention coalition partners when discussing their top three issues. However, liberal groups cite a higher number of coalition partners than conservative groups do when asked whether they allied themselves in 2003 with a religious group, a business group, or a non-religious, nonprofit organization. Their numbers are 2.5 (liberal) and 2.1 (conservative), respectively.

If liberal and conservative groups differ in their strategic choices, they also differ in their staff sizes and funding sources.

As Table 2 indicates, liberal groups have larger staffs than conservative groups. Their staff sizes outnumber those of their conservative counterparts by approximately 2 to 1. In this respect, liberal and conservative groups at the state level may differ from their national counterparts. Many conservative groups active at the national level are well-funded and well-

staffed. Focus on the Family, for example, boasts 1,700 employees and an annual budget of \$130 million (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004).

Liberal groups also differ from conservative groups in their funding sources. Government agencies and private foundations account for 77.5% of the liberal groups' funding sources, but a mere 7.8% of the conservative groups' funding sources. To put it another way, membership donations and individual gifts account for 92.2% of the conservative groups' funding sources, as opposed to 22.5% of the liberal groups' funding sources.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

In the tables that follow, I focus on one possible explanation for differences in the strategic choices of liberal and conservative public interest groups: funding sources. Do liberal groups prefer insider strategies, public policy research, and coalition-building because they rely more heavily on private foundations and government agencies (patrons) for their funding? Or, conversely, do conservative groups eschew insider strategies, public policy research, and (to some extent) coalition-building because they rely more heavily on mass membership dues and individual contributions?

Table 3 suggests that differences in funding sources do not explain the liberal groups' preference for insider strategies. The inclusion of a funding sources variable in the multivariate model does not change a key fact: the type of group (liberal, conservative) remains a good predictor of insider strategies.

In contrast, differences in funding sources do help to explain the liberal groups' preference for public policy research and their less dramatic preference for coalition-building. In

Tables 4 (public policy research) and 5 (coalition-building), group type no longer remains a good predictor of strategic choices when funding sources are included in the model.

Other variables also help to explain strategic choices. Groups that face a larger number of opponents prefer outsider strategies, perhaps because they need to expand the scope of conflict in order to succeed in a more hostile political environment. Of course, there is no guarantee that expansion of the scope of conflict will be a successful strategy. As Kollman (1998) has noted, much depends on whether public opinion is supportive of the group's goals.

Groups that face a more conservative citizenry produce fewer public policy reports. Rightly or wrongly, advocacy groups seem to have concluded that liberal citizens are more receptive to public policy research than conservative citizens. One might imagine interaction effects between group type and citizen ideology, but the inclusion of an interaction term does not change the basic findings reported here.

The findings for coalition-building parallel those for outsider strategies. Groups are more likely to seek out coalition partners of different types when they face more opponents in their political environment. In effect, the presence of hostile interest groups triggers a quest to identify supportive interest groups.

DISCUSSION

This research both supports and challenges the existing literature on public interest group strategies and tactics. As Nownes and Freeman (1998) argue, most public interest groups use a mix of insider and outsider strategies. Few groups rely on only one broad type of strategy. However, the distinction between insider and outsider strategies is an important one. In particular, conservative groups prefer outsider strategies to insider strategies, while liberal

groups do not. Thus, this distinction, highlighted by other scholars, is important.

As Berry (1999) asserts, liberal groups prefer a more balanced mix of insider and outsider strategies, while conservative groups prefer outsider strategies. Berry's findings, at the national level, hold up at the state level as well. However, these are not the only important differences between liberal and conservative groups. For example, liberal groups are much more likely to produce public policy reports and are somewhat more likely to join coalitions.

Funding sources help to explain the strategic choices of interest groups, as Gais and Walker (1991) have pointed out. In particular, groups more dependent on patrons (private foundations, government agencies) are more likely to produce public policy reports and are more likely to join coalitions. Indeed, the inclusion of patron funding in a multivariate model determines whether group type (liberal v. conservative) is a statistically significant predictor of these strategic choices. Some of Gais and Walker's findings, however, are not substantiated. For example, the presence of organized opposition encourages outsider strategies, not insider strategies.

As Hula (1999) asserts, both liberal and conservative groups appreciate the value of coalitions. This seems to be true of liberal and conservative public interest groups active at the state level. On balance, liberal groups join coalitions more often than conservative groups. However, in substantive terms, this distinction is fairly small.

Naturally, one wonders whether liberal and conservative public interest groups are making strategic choices that advance their respective causes. For example, does the strong preference of conservative groups for outsider strategies enable them to generate more public support?

Although it is impossible to answer this question definitively, it is possible to see which

type of group has been more successful in generating press coverage. Each organization's executive director was asked to estimate the number of news stories that mentioned the group by name in 2003. If outsider strategies generate more public support, then as an intermediate step they ought to generate more press coverage.

As Table 6 suggests, liberal groups that invest more in outsider strategies do in fact generate twice as many news stories as liberal groups that invest more in insider strategies. The pattern is even more pronounced for conservative groups, although very small cell sizes make it impossible to draw firm conclusions. In short, outsider strategies appear to be useful in expanding the scope of conflict.

To further explore this line of inquiry, it would be useful to know how important news stories are in promoting public or elite support for particular points of view. Conceivably, this depends on the orientation and fluidity of public opinion in each state.

CONCLUSION

Research on public advocacy groups active at the national level suggests that liberal and conservative groups differ in their strategic choices. Berry (1999) has argued that conservative groups are more committed to outsider strategies, while liberal groups are more committed to a mix of insider and outsider strategies. Similar differences are apparent at the state level, plus others not previously observed. For example, liberal groups are much more likely than conservative groups to produce public policy reports and somewhat more likely to join coalitions.

Differences in funding sources help to explain some of the differences in strategic choices. Liberal groups are more likely to produce public policy reports and are more likely to join coalitions because they are more dependent on patrons (private foundations, government

agencies) for their funding. Apparently, patrons like to see empirical research, and they also like to see broad-based coalitions.

The decision to invest more in insider or outsider strategies is more difficult to explain, but it appears to be important. For both liberal and conservative groups, greater use of outsider strategies is associated with more news coverage. Whether this effort to expand the scope of conflict pays off remains to be seen. Much may depend on the general public's ideology or, more specifically, its support for specific policy proposals.

What is clear is that liberal and conservative groups try to influence public policy in different ways. The paradigmatic liberal approach is more direct, more technocratic, and more collaborative. The paradigmatic conservative approach is more indirect, more rhetorical, and more independent. Although liberal and conservative public interest groups draw upon the same basic repertoire of strategic tools, their strategic preferences are quite distinctive.

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TABLE 1

STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS

	LIBERAL GROUPS	CONSERVATIVE GROUPS
	(N=50)	(N=29)
INSIDER STRATEGIES/ ALL STRATEGIES	29.1%	15.8% ^b
OUTSIDER STRATEGIES/ ALL STRATEGIES	25.8%	39.8% ^a
NUMBER OF PUBLIC POLICYREPORTS/YEAR	5.8	0.7 ^a
COMMITMENT TO POLICY RESEARCH	2.6	2.4
NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO COALITIONS (ISSUE-SPECIFIC)	5.5	5.2
COLLABORATION WITH TYPES OF GROUPS (BUSINESS, RELIGIOUS, OTHER NONPROFIT)	2.5	2.1 ^b

Note: Three of the variables are ordinal-level measures, with the following ranges: commitment to policy research (0-4); number of references to coalitions (0-12); and collaboration with types of groups (0-3). The rest are interval-level variables.

^a $p < 0.01$

^b $p < 0.05$

TABLE 2

FINANCIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS

	LIBERAL GROUPS	CONSERVATIVE GROUPS
	(N=50)	(N=29)
STAFF SIZE	10.8	5.1 ^a
FUNDING FROM PATRONS/ ALL FUNDING	77.5%	7.8% ^a
FUNDING FROM GRASSROOTS/ ALL FUNDING	22.5%	92.2% ^a

Note: Funding from patrons includes money from private foundations and government agencies. Funding from grassroots sources includes money from membership dues and individual donations, including corporate donations.

^a $p < 0.0001$

TABLE 3
 OUTSIDER STRATEGY MODELS
 (N=70)

	MODEL A	MODEL B
Conservative Group	12.788 ^b (6.717)	26.416 ^a (11.020)
Patron Funding	—————	0.215 (0.139)
Number of Employees	0.226 (0.408)	0.077 (0.414)
Republican Pct., House	0.912 (25.339)	-0.800 (25.068)
Number of Opponents	5.239 ^b (2.791)	5.456 ^b (2.762)
Legislative Session Length	0.120 (1.078)	0.300 (1.071)
Republican Governor	-2.032 (6.564)	-2.595 (6.498)
Southern State	13.750 (9.100)	16.451 ^b (9.161)
Interest Group Diversity	0.149 (0.502)	0.263 (0.502)
Interest Group Density	-0.011 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.028)
Citizen Ideology	-0.900 (0.985)	-1.251 (1.000)
	Adjusted R ² = 0.11	Adjusted R ² = 0.13

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Multiple regression analysis; the dependent variable is the percentage of time devoted to outsider strategies (press releases, mass mailings, interviews with reporters, press conferences, op-ed pieces, rallies and demonstrations, etc.).

^a p < 0.05

^b p < 0.10

TABLE 4
PUBLIC POLICY REPORT MODELS

(N=70)

	MODEL A	MODEL B
Conservative Group	-4.913 ^b (1.851)	0.321 (2.978)
Patron Funding	_____	0.083 ^b (0.038)
Number of Employees	0.231 ^b (0.112)	0.173 (0.112)
Republican Pct., House	3.574 (6.985)	2.916 (6.774)
Number of Opponents	0.784 (0.769)	0.867 (0.746)
Legislative Session Length	-0.340 (0.297)	-0.271 (0.289)
Republican Governor	0.331 (1.809)	0.115 (1.756)
Southern State	1.830 (2.508)	2.867 (2.476)
Interest Group Diversity	-0.161 (0.138)	-0.117 (0.136)
Interest Group Density	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)
Citizen Ideology	-0.781 ^a (0.272)	-0.916 ^a (0.270)
	Adjusted R ² = 0.24	Adjusted R ² = 0.29

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Multiple regression analysis; the dependent variable is the number of public policy reports produced by the group.

^a p < 0.01

^b p < 0.05

TABLE 5
COALITION PARTNER MODELS

(N=70)

	MODEL A	MODEL B
Conservative Group	-1.864 ^b (0.692)	-0.649 (1.019)
Patron Funding	_____	0.022 (0.014)
Number of Employees	0.037 (0.046)	0.015 (0.048)
Republican Pct., House	-1.733 (2.579)	-2.124 (2.638)
Number of Opponents	0.978 ^b (0.313)	1.072 ^a (0.333)
Legislative Session Length	0.025 (0.114)	0.051 (0.117)
Republican Governor	-0.138 (0.664)	-0.200 (0.674)
Southern State	0.086 (0.917)	0.455 (0.944)
Interest Group Diversity	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.013 (0.052)
Interest Group Density	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 ^d (0.003)
Citizen Ideology	-0.031 (0.100)	-0.073 (0.104)
	Pseudo R ² = 0.15	Pseudo R ² = 0.17

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ordered logit analysis; the dependent variable measures the breadth of the group's coalition-building activity.

^a p < 0.001

^b p < 0.01

^c p < 0.05

^d p < 0.10

TABLE 6
NEWS COVERAGE BY
OUTSIDER/INSIDER STRATEGY

	TIMEOUT>TIMEIN	TIMEIN>TIMEOUT
LIBERAL GROUPS	98.4 (N=24)	47.7 ^b (N=14)
<hr/>		
CONSERVATIVE GROUPS	94.3 (N=21)	6.5 ^a (N=2)
<hr/>		

Note: News coverage is the number of news stories that referred to each group, as estimated by the group's executive director.

^a $p < .01$

^b $p < .05$

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1. Almost all of the family advocacy groups included in this study (28/30) identified themselves as conservative (two chose not to identify themselves ideologically). Most of the child advocacy groups included in this study (32/50) identified themselves as liberal, but a substantial number (17/50) identified themselves as moderate or middle-of-the-road, either because they genuinely believe that or because they prefer to avoid the “liberal” label. Only one child advocacy group identified itself as conservative.
 2. The web-site, <http://www.policyexperts.org>, features a list of largely state-based organizations, under the heading “organizations” and the sub-heading “family policy organizations.” I accessed the web-site on June 26, 2003.
 3. If an organization mentioned the same coalition partner for two issues, both references were counted.
 4. This measure differs somewhat from a similar measure developed by Gais and Walker (1991: 113-114).
 5. In fact, this is an inverse measure of density, with higher numbers indicating a lower density.